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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Devonel
(decided December 24, 2008)
Damien Devone was arrested for two counts of criminal pos-
session of a controlled substance. 2 Police found Devone to be in pos-
session of cocaine after a police dog detected the presence of drugs
during a walk around of the exterior of a car, in which he was a pas-
senger, during a routine traffic stop. 3 The Schenectady County Court
suppressed the evidence uncovered by police officers and the State
appealed.4 Devone alleged that the use of the police dog constituted
an unlawful search under both the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution5 and under Article I section 12 of the New York
Constitution. 6
Police officers observed Troy Washington talking on his cel-
lular phone while driving and, as a result, conducted a routine traffic
stop; Devone was a passenger in the car.7 The officers conducting
the traffic stop were a New York State Trooper and a Schenectady
County Police officer.8 They were working together on a task force
entitled "Operation Impact,"9 a program that uses "intelligence-
driven policing strategies . . . to target violent crime in high-crimes
' 870 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008).
2 Id. at 515.
SId.
4 Id.
See, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
6 See, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;"
Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
Id. at 514. New York State statute prohibits the use ofa mobile telephone to make a call
while the vehicle is in motion. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c (McKinney 2009).
8 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
9 Id.
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areas in Upstate [New York] and on Long Island."'o In their patrol
car they had a dog trained in detecting the presence of narcotics,
which accompanied them during routine patrol."
During the traffic stop, Washington failed to produce a driv-
er's license or the car's registration, nor could he provide the officers
with a response as to where he was going.12 Upon further question-
ing, Washington told the officers "the car was registered to his cou-
sin," however, he stated that "he did not know his cousin's name." 3
When the officer "asked where his cousin was, he pointed to the de-
fendant."l 4 The officers then learned through computer verification
that "while the car had not been reported as stolen, it was not regis-
tered to [the] defendant."" A computer check also revealed that
Washington did have a driver's license, and that it was possible the
car was being driven legally.16
Despite the fact that Devone may have been driving legally,
his responses to routine questioning caused the police officers to be-
come suspicious of Washington and Devone." As a result of such
suspicion, the officers decided to have the narcotics-detecting dog
walk around the car.' 8 During the walk, the police canine alerted to
the presence of drugs in the car.19 The officers opened the car door to
allow the canine find the specific location of the drugs. 20 While in-
side, the police dog signaled to the armrest console, to which the of-
ficers found cocaine.2' Washington and Devone each were charged
with "criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third de-
gree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth
degree." 2 2
to David A. Paterson, Governor, State of New York, State of the State Address: Our Time
to Lead (2009) (explaining the details of "Operation Impact").
" Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
12 id.
13 id.
14 Id. at 514-15
15 Id. at 515.
16 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
'Id
18 Id
19 Id
20 id
21 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
22 Id. For the statutory requirements of criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the third degree see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16 (McKinney 2009). For the statutory re-
822 [Vol. 26
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At trial, Devone sought to have the evidence of cocaine sup-
pressed, alleging that the search by the dog was unlawful.23 The
county court suppressed the evidence, holding that because the police
officers only had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot,
they only had the right to obtain consent from the occupants to search
the car.2 4 The court concluded that to satisfy the New York Constitu-
tion there must be a "higher showing of a reasonable suspicion" to
warrant a "canine sniff of the car's exterior" and no such suspicion
existed.25
The State appealed, alleging that the police officers where
within the bounds of the state constitution to allow the police dog to
walk around the exterior of the car to detect the existence of drugs. 26
The Appellate Division, Third Department agreed, holding that a
founded suspicion justifies a canine sniff of the car's exterior to
search for drugs. 27 The court concluded that the "diminished expec-
tation of privacy" in a car and the unobtrusiveness of a canine sniff
did not constitute a violation of defendant's constitutional rights
against unlawful search and seizures.28
The issue presented before the court was whether under either
the Fourth Amendment or under Article I section 12 of the New York
Constitution, a reasonable suspicion is the minimum requirement to
warrant the use of a police dog to walk around a car during a routine
traffic stop in an effort to find drugs.29
The standard for the use of a canine sniff to detect the pres-
ence of drugs under the federal constitution was established in United
States v. Place.30 In Place, the defendant, Raymond Place, was at the
Miami International Airport, standing in line to purchase airline tick-
ets to New York.31 While Place was in line, police officers became
suspicious of his behavior and approached Place as he started walk-
quirements of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree see N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 220.09 (McKinney 2009).
23 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
24 id
25 id
26 id
27 Id. at 516.
28 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
29 Id at 514.
30 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
1 Id. at 698.
2010] 8 23
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ing towards the gate to board his flight, and requested that he produce
his airline ticket and identification. 32 Place complied with this re-
quest. 33 Furthermore, police obtained consent from Place to search
two bags that he had already checked, however, the officers decided
not to search the bags since Place's flight was about to depart.34 At
the conclusion of the inquiry from the police officers, Place made a
comment that he had noticed the police officers' presence prior to
approaching him.3 ' This remark impelled the officers to examine the
address tags on Place's checked luggage.36 Upon inspection, police
found that the addresses on the two bags were different, the addresses
did not exist, and the telephone numbers Place provided did not be-
long to him.37
Based on this information and other suspicions, the police of-
ficers contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") in
New York, to alert them of their suspicion.38 Upon Place's arrival at
LaGuardia Airport in New York, DEA agents approached Place and
informed him that the information they had received from police of-
ficers in Miami suggested that Place was in possession of narcotics.
The DEA agents requested Place to consent to a search of his lug-
gage, but he refused. 40 Agents then informed Place that they were
taking his luggage to a federal judge in order to obtain a search war-
rant and while Place was allowed to accompany the agents, he de-
clined to do so. 4 1 The agents then took Place's luggage to Kennedy
Airport where they had a canine police dog, trained in narcotic detec-
tion, sniff the luggage. 42 During the sniff, the dog alerted to the pres-
ence of narcotics in one of the defendant's bags.43 Since the search
was conducted on a Friday afternoon the agents had to wait until
Monday morning to obtain a search warrant from a magistrate judge
32 id
SId
34 id.
35 Place, 463 U.S. at 698.
36 id.
3 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 698-99.
40 Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
41id
42 id.
43 id.
824 [Vol. 26
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to allow the search of the bag." They obtained a warrant and as a re-
sult of a search of the bag agents uncovered 1125 grams of cocaine.45
Place was charged with "possession of cocaine with intent to distri-
bute."4 6
The issue presented before the United States Supreme Court
was whether the detainment of Place's luggage and subsequent expo-
sure to drug detecting dogs, based on a reasonable suspicion that the
luggage contained narcotics, violated Place's Fourth Amendment
rights. 47 The Court concluded that due to the uniqueness and the un-
obtrusive nature of the canine sniff, the "exposure of [Place's] lug-
gage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment."48 However, the Court ultimately held that the length of de-
tainment of the defendant's bags, which was approximately ninety
minutes from the initial seizure of Place's bag at the airport to the
time of the canine sniff, rendered the seizure of the bags unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 49 Therefore, while a canine sniff of
the bags did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court nevertheless suppressed the evidence resulting from
the actual search of the luggage due to the unreasonableness of the
detainment of Place's bags.50
In a more recent case, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of the use of a canine sniff during a routine traffic
stop. In Illinois v. Caballes," the defendant was pulled over by a
state trooper for speeding.52 Shortly thereafter, another state trooper
accompanied by a "narcotics-detection-dog" arrived at the scene."
While the initial police officer was writing the defendant a warning
ticket for speeding, the other state trooper had the dog walk around
the car to detect the presence of drugs. 54 During the walk around the
4 Id
45 Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
46 id
4 Id. at 697-98.
48 Id. at 707.
49 Id. at 709-10.
50 Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 710.
" (Caballes .l), 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
52 Id at 406.
53 id.
54 id.
2010] 825
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dog alerted to the trunk. 5 Police searched the trunk and found mari-
juana, and the defendant was arrested.56
The defendant was convicted on drug charges and sentenced
to twelve years in prison and a fine of over $200,000.17 The defen-
dant sought to have the marijuana suppressed alleging that the search
by the police was unlawful.5 8 The trial court denied the motion, hold-
ing that the use of the canine to detect drugs did not cause an unrea-
sonable delay to the traffic stop, considering that from the time the
defendant was pulled over to the time the drugs were found only ten
minutes had elapsed.5 9 Furthermore, the trial court held that the alert
by the police dog, indicating the presence of drugs, "was sufficiently
reliable to provide probable cause" to allow the police to conduct the
search of defendant's car.60 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. 61 There
the court held that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the
defendant was engaged in drug activity to warrant the use of a police
dog to detect the presence of drugs. 62 The use of such dog unjustifia-
bly turned a "routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." 63 There-
fore, the court concluded that the use of the dog resulted in a constitu-
tional violation.64
In a six to two decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Illi-
nois Supreme Court, concluding that the use of a police dog to reveal
the presence of drugs did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that while
the initial seizure during the routine traffic stop was lawful, such sei-
zure could "become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time rea-
sonably required to complete [the traffic stop]."" In other words, if
the canine sniff of the car's exterior took longer than what was rea-
55 Id.
s6 Caballes II, 543 U.S. at 406.
s7Id. at 407.
See id.
' Id. at 406-07.
60 Id. at 407.
61 Caballes II, 543 U.S. at 407.
62 Illinois v. Caballes (Caballes 1), 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 2003).
63 id.
6 See id. at 205.
65 Caballes II, 543 U.S. at 410 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not take part in the
decision).
66 Id. at 407.
826 [Vol. 26
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sonably required to issue a warning ticket to the defendant, his Fourth
Amendment rights would be violated.67
The Court accepted the lower court's conclusion that the de-
fendant was not subjected to an unreasonably prolonged seizure. 68
The time taken to conduct the investigation and uncover the presence
of drugs was justified by the nature of the traffic stop. 69 While both
the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court
agreed that there was not a prolonged investigation, the courts dif-
fered as to the constitutionality of the actual dog sniff.70 Justice Ste-
vens held that a dog sniff conducted "in a reasonable manner" does
not cause a legal traffic stop to become unlawful "unless the dog sniff
itself infringed" upon the defendant's privacy interests. Since no
person can have a legitimate privacy interest in possessing illegal
contraband, the Court concluded that a dog sniff that only detects the
presence of narcotics does not infringe upon the privacy interest of an
individual.72 No legitimate privacy interests are implicated because
the presence of any lawful items will "remain hidden from public
view."73 Since there was not an infringement on the defendant's pri-
vacy interest, nor was there an unreasonably prolonged seizure, the
Supreme Court upheld the use of a dog sniff to determine the pres-
ence of illegal narcotics, finding no Fourth Amendment violation.74
The New York courts have dealt with similar issues dealing
with the legality of a dog sniff under the New York Constitution. In
People v. Dunn,7 5 the police received information alleging that drugs
were being kept in the defendant's apartment. 76 Based on the infor-
mation, the police had a narcotics detecting dog sniff the outside of
the apartment.n The dog alerted to the presence of drugs and based
on the reaction from the dog and other information police obtained a
67 id.
6 Id. at 408.
69 Id.
'0 Caballes II, 543 U.S. at 408.
71 id
72 Id. at 408, 410.
n Id. at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
74 Id. at 408, 410.
7 People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990).
76 Id. at 1055.
77 id
2010] 827
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warrant to search the apartment. As a result of the search, police
found a large quantity of drugs and two handguns.7 9 The police then
obtained another search warrant for a second apartment belonging to
the defendant, where the police also found drugs and drug parapher-
nalia.so
Upon indictment for the possession of the contraband, the de-
fendant sought to suppress all evidence that had been seized during
the search of his apartments '.81 He alleged that the use of the dog to
detect the presence of drugs outside of his apartment "constituted an
unlawful warrantless search unsupported by probable cause." 82 The
trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress and the defen-
dant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding in a
plurality decision that the dog sniff did not constitute a search "within
the meaning of either the Federal or . . . State Constitution." 8 4 Al-
though the Appellate Division concluded that a dog sniff did not con-
stitute a search, it nevertheless held that police had a reasonable sus-
picion that would have warranted a search.ss
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision; howev-
er, it rejected the conclusion that use of a narcotic-detecting dog does
not constitute a search. 86 In doing so, the New York Court of Ap-
peals declined to apply the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Place to the New York Constitutional protection against unreasona-
ble search and seizures. The New York Court of Appeals held that
the decision in Place "undercut[s] the right of our citizens to be free
from unreasonable government intrusions" and therefore will not be
followed by the New York courts. Thus, the court concluded that
the use of the narcotic-detecting dog outside the defendant's apart-
ment intruded "into an area where an individual has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" and therefore constituted a search under the
78 id.
79 id.
80 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1055-56.
8! Id at 1056.
82 id.
83 Id
84 Id.
8 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1056.
86 Id. at 1058-59.
87 Id. at 1057.
88 Id.
828 [Vol. 26
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New York Constitution."
The Dunn court also held, however, that due to the unobtru-
siveness and "its significant utility to law enforcement authorities,"
the use of a canine dog for drug related investigations may be con-
ducted without probable cause or a warrant so long as there is a rea-
sonable suspicion that illegal contraband is present in a residence. 90
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that there was a reasona-
ble suspicion to warrant the use of a dog sniff to detect the presence
of drugs and that the defendant's New York Constitutional rights
were not violated. 91
Therefore, while Dunn held that the use of a dog to detect the
presence of narcotics outside an individual's apartment did constitute
a search under the New York Constitution, 92 the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that a reasonable suspicion is required to conduct
a search. 93
In People v. Offen,94 the New York Court of Appeals ex-
tended the holding in Dunn and upheld the use of a narcotic-detecting
dog, basing its holding on police's reasonable suspicion.95 In Offen,
based on information that defendant was receiving packages contain-
ing drugs through UPS and other carrier companies, the police had a
canine dog sniff the exterior of one of the suspicious packages. 96 The
dog alerted the presence of narcotics and police then conducted an X-
ray scan of the package, which revealed potential illegal contra-
band.9 7 Upon the execution of a search warrant, police found drugs
in the packages.98
The defendant alleged that the canine sniff violated his state
constitutional rights; however, the New York Court of Appeals re-
jected the defendant's argument. 99 Relying on the holding in Dunn
the court concluded that "despite the absence of a warrant or probable
89 Id. at 1058.
90 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
9' Id. at 1059.
92 Id. at 1058.
93 id.
94 585 N.E.2d 370 (N.Y. 1991).
9 Id. at 372.
96 Id. at 371.
97 id.
98 See id.
99 Offen, 585 N.E.2d. at 371-72.
2010] 829
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cause" the use of a narcotic-detecting dog did not violate defendant's
state constitutional right because there was "sufficient information to
support a reasonable suspicion that the package contained contra-
band."100
The Fourth Department addressed the legality of a dog sniff
with regards to an individual's car during a traffic stop in People v.
Estrella.' In Estrella, the defendant was subjected to a traffic stop
for having heavily tinted windows.102 During the stop, the police had
a narcotics-detecting dog sniff the exterior of his car.103 The dog
alerted to the presence of drugs and police obtained a warrant to
search the car, where they uncovered the drugs.104
The defendant challenged the issuance of the warrant based
on the use of the narcotic-detecting dog. 0 5 The Appellate Division
upheld that trial court's decision, holding that "the use of a narcotics-
detecting dog to sniff the exterior of the vehicle during a lawful stop
of his vehicle did not violate [the defendant's] constitutional right to
be protected from unlawful search and seizure."1 06 On appeal, the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the ruling; however, the court
addresses a different issue. 0 7
While the Esstrella court concluded that the use of a dog to
detect the presence of drugs did not violate the defendant's constitu-
tional rights, the court failed to discuss the level of suspicion required
to conduct such a search.'0 8 In other words, the court did not specify
whether reasonable suspicion was necessary for police to conduct a
search by a dog sniff, or merely a founded suspicion. 09
Relying on Caballes, the Devone court quickly dismissed the
defendant's claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated." 0
Devone made no allegations that he was subjected to an unreasonably
oo Id. at 372.
1o1 People v. Estrella, 851 N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008), af'd, 893 N.E.2d
134 (N.Y. 2008).
102 Id. at 794. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375 (1) (b) (McKinney 2009).
103 Id. at 795.
'0 See id.
1os See id at 795-96.
106 Estrella, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (citing Caballes 1, 543 U.S. at 409).
107 People v. Estrella, 893 N.E.2d 134, 135 (N.Y. 2008).
'08 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
'0 Id.
110 Id.
830 Vol. 26
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prolonged traffic stop; any such argument would be without merit,
since the narcotic detecting dog was already present in the police of-
ficer's car.11' The length of the stop was justified by the fact that po-
lice had to verify certain information as a result of the inconsistencies
of the driver's statements that he made to police.1 12
While there was no valid claim under the Federal Constitu-
tional, given New York's broader protections against searches and
seizures under Article I section 12 of the New York Constitution, the
Devone court was inclined to consider New York's constitutional
analysis.' 13 While the holding in Dunn did not require probable cause
or a warrant to conduct a dog sniff of the outside of a residence, the
court did require that there be a reasonable suspicion that illegal con-
traband is present in a residence. 114 However, the Devone court re-
fused to extend the decision in Dunn to encompass automobiles."
Instead, the court relied on the holding in People v. Yancy,1 16
which concluded that occupants in a car have a "diminished expecta-
tion of privacy," and that there is "an exception to the general rule
that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable" when it comes to au-
tomobiles."' 7 Based on this holding, the Devone court reasoned that
the same standard used by the courts regarding the search of homes
does not apply to vehicles.' 18 Therefore, the court refused to require
a reasonable suspicion to warrant the use of a narcotic detecting dog
as was required in Dunn.119
The Devone court did, however, rely on the conclusion in
Dunn that a dog sniff "is far less intrusive than a full-blown
search."120 Therefore, taking the holding in Yancy together with the
court's holding in Dunn, the Devone court concluded that because of
the "diminished expectation of privacy" in a car and the unobtrusive-
ness of a dog sniff, there need only be a founded suspicion to warrant
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (citing Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1057-58).
114 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
115 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
"1 654 N.E.2d 1233 (N.Y. 1995).
117 Id. at 1236.
118 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
11 Id. at 516.
120 Id. (quoting Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058).
2010] 831
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the use of a dog sniff to conduct a search of the exterior of a car.121
Once the dog alerts to the presence of illegal contraband, given the
New York Court of Appeals holding in People v. Gathogo,122 police
then have probable cause to conduct a search of the interior of the
car. 123
Thus, the appellate court rejected the lower court's holding
that reasonable suspicion is required to use a dog sniff of the exterior
of the car in order to satisfy the New York Constitution.124 While the
lower court held that based on founded suspicion, police had the right
to request the consent from the occupants to search the car, the appel-
late division concluded that this lower level of suspicion allows for
the use of a dog to sniff the exterior of the car, so long as the initial
traffic stop is lawful and is not unreasonably prolonged, as required
under the United States Constitution.125
The Devone court supported its holding by quoting the court
in Estrella, which concluded that the use of a narcotics detecting dog
did not constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures. 126 The Devone court inferred
that the Estrella court used a level of suspicion lower than a founded
suspicion to reach its conclusion.127
The decision in Devone is troubling. The court clearly distin-
guished reasonable suspicion from founded suspicion, finding that
founded suspicion is a lower level threshold for searches and sei-
zures, and that there need only be a founded suspicion to warrant the
use of a dog sniff on the exterior of a car.128 This conclusion, howev-
er, is not supported by any case law. While there have been a few re-
cent trial court and appellate court decisions holding that a founded
suspicion warrants the use of a narcotic-detecting dog,129 there is no
121 id
122 715 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000) (concluding that once a narcotic detect-
ing dog alerts to the presence of drugs, police have probably cause to search the car).
123 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
124 id.
125 Id. at 516; Caballes 1, 543 U.S. at 407.
126 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16.
127 Id. at 516 ("Since there was a founded suspicion here, we need not address whether a
lesser showing-such as applies to the 4th Amendment and arguably was applied in People v.
Estrella - would satisfy the NY Constitution.").
128 id.
129 See, e.g., People v. Adams, No. 1007N/09, 2009 WL 3068401, at *7 (Sup. Ct. Nassua
County Sept. 24, 2009) (holding that police had a "founded suspicion that there were drugs
[Vol. 26832
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case law from the New York Court of Appeals supporting this hold-
ing.
The four-level test set forth in People v. De Bour 30 is essen-
tial to the proper determination of Devone.'3 1 This four-level test
evaluates police encounters with individuals in public places. 132 The
first level allows police to request information from an individual
"when there is some objective credible reason for that interference
not necessarily indicative of criminality."l 33 Level two is the "com-
mon-law right to inquire" which is permissible when police have a
"founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a some-
what greater intrusion in that a policeman is entitled to interfere with
a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but
short of a forcible seizure."1 34 The third level is based on the police
officer's reasonable suspicion that an individual "has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor."' 3 5 Un-
der these circumstances, a police officer may forcibly stop and detain
that individual for questioning.' 36 Furthermore, under this third level,
the officer has the right to frisk the individual if "the officer reasona-
bly suspects that he is in danger of physical injury by virtue of the de-
tainee being armed."l 37 The fourth and final level requires that police
have probable cause that an individual "has committed a crime, or of-
fense in his presence" in order to make an arrest and take an individ-
ual into custody.138
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals has held that a
"founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" may give rise to a
"common-law right to inquire," and this right does not permit police
to violate the Constitution.' 39 Furthermore, courts have "consistently
in the vehicle" permitting the use of a "canine sniff of the exterior of the vehicle"); see also
People v. Abdur-Rashid, 883 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646-47 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009) (holding that
police had a "founded suspicion that criminality was afoot" to warrant the use of a canine
dog to detect the presence of drugs in a car).
130 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
' See id. at 571-72.
132 Id. at 572.
' Id. at 571-72.
134 Id. at 572.
135 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.; People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 878 (N.Y. 1975).
2010] 833
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limited this power when it has been exercised solely on the basis of
vague suspicion or as a means of harassment."l 40 While merely re-
questing general information about an individual's identity, destina-
tion, and other unobtrusive information does not require any level of
suspicion by police, once an officer begins to inquire about the possi-
bility of criminal activity, " 'the encounter has become a common-
law inquiry that must be supported by founded suspicion that crimi-
nality is afoot.' "141
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals has extended
founded suspicion to apply only to the common law right of inquiry.
The Devone court agreed with the lower court that police had a
founded suspicion that criminal activity was present.142 However, the
courts differed as to the application of the founded suspicion.143
The lower court concluded that a founded suspicion only
amounted to "a general common-law right to inquiry," allowing po-
lice to request that they be able to search the interior of the car.144
The trial court was unwilling to allow the use of a canine sniff based
merely on founded suspicion and instead required that there be a rea-
sonable suspicion that criminal activity is present. 141
Based on prior case law, the trial court was correct in its hold-
ing. However, the appellate division rejected the trial court's find-
ings and gave unprecedented authority to police. The reasoning in
Devone is incompatible with other decisions from the New York
Court of Appeals. The New York Court of Appeals has required that
there be a reasonable suspicion to warrant the use of a canine dog
sniff in circumstances other than a residence, such as in Offen, where
the court extended the holding in Dunn to packages shipped through
the mail.14 6 Therefore, the Devone court was erroneous in its deci-
sion to limit the holding in Dunn to apply only to apartments.
While the Devone court held that police had a founded suspi-
cion that criminal activity was present, based on the four-level test set
forth in De Bour, the police were only permitted to obtain "explana-
140 Cantor, 324 N.E.2d at 878.
141 People v. Battaglia, 655 N.E.2d 169, 170 (N.Y. 1995) (quoting People v. Hollman, 590
N.E.2d 204, 210 (N.Y. 1992).
142 See Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
143 See id.
144 Id.
145 id
146 See Offen, 585 N.E.2d at 372.
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tory information" from the occupants in the vehicle.147 They were
not permitted to conduct a search using a narcotic-detecting dog.14 8
While there is little case law in New York addressing the con-
stitutionality of the use of narcotic-detecting dogs on the exterior of
vehicles,149 the holding in Devone is flawed. The idea that there need
only be a founded suspicion to conduct a search using a narcotic-
detecting dog is inconsistent with New York case law and contrary to
the New York Constitution. While such a search may be valid pur-
suant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
Devone court should have invalidated the search under Article I sec-
tion 12 of the New York Constitution.
Gregory Zak
147 Devone, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
148 See De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. Under the holding in Dunn the use of a canine dog
sniff of an individual's apartment constituted a search under the N.Y. Constitution. Dunn,
564 N.E.2d at 1058.
149 See People v. Cohen, No. 2009-025, 2009 WL 3364578 at *5 (St. Lawrence County
Ct. Oct. 19, 2009).
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